sometimes compete with statewide national identities. These identities are nurtured within distinctive institutions and civil societies. These features have engendered important territorial political cleavages in each case which can heighten the stakes invested in devolved elections for parties, the media and voters. There is variation across the devolved territories here, but this is more in the degree than in the form of the territorial cleavage. Greater variation is evident if we include London as a devolved territory; regionalist parties do not operate in London, and although the statewide parties may 'play the London card', this is not manifest in demands for greater political autonomy. The asymmetrical nature of multi-level government in the UK has generated moderate variation in the levels of regional autonomy. Autonomy in Scotland and Northern Ireland is higher than in Wales, but the National Assembly for Wales enjoys considerably more autonomy than the London Assembly, and has increased its legislative autonomy in recent years. We should thus expect second-order effects to be heightened in London Assembly elections and to a diminishing extent in elections to the National Assembly for Wales, and less apparent in devolved contests in Scotland and (to the extent that they can be measured here at all) in Northern Ireland. Examining only regional elections in the UK would only give a partial insight into territorial party politics, which was evident in the UK long before the establishment of multi-level government. We will thus also consider patterns of voting behavior in Westminster elections in the different nations and regions of the UK, including within England.
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, it sets out the nature of multi-level government in the United Kingdom, highlighting the asymmetry in the constitutional configuration of UK devolution and the modes by which parliamentarians are elected in each of the UK's main political arenas. Second, it conducts an analysis of the degree of congruence and incongruence in vote shares for parties competing in statewide and regional electoral arenas. Third, it examines two key features associated with second-order elections theory: electoral turnout, and party losses and gains between state and sub-state elections. Finally, it considers the extent to which devolution has led to a regionalization of the vote, in light of the heightened presence and success of non-statewide parties and the profound incongruence in the political composition of state and regional government which has emerged in recent years.
The chapter concludes by assessing the variations within the UK case, which in part provide some support for the assumptions of a more nuanced application of second-order elections theory.
Regional government and regional elections
Until devolution was introduced to Scotland and Wales in 1999, and re-introduced to Northern Ireland in 1998, the UK was a highly centralized state. This centralization took the form of concentrating legislative power in Westminster and governing power in Whitehall.
Yet, although the centralization of legislative power was complete, the centralization of governing power never was. Throughout the twentieth century, the territorial ministries of state, first in Scotland and later in Wales, gradually developed more administrative autonomy and responsibility for implementing a wide range of public policy and law. In Scotland in particular, political union had coincided with the retention of institutional distinctiveness. This was initially embodied within a distinctive legal system, church, education system and local government. From the late 19 th century, the Scottish Office and the post of Scottish Secretary (later Secretary of State for Scotland), in spite of being offices of central government, assumed the symbolic significance of representing Scotland's national distinctiveness within the UK (Mitchell, 2003) . Thus, long before devolution, Scotland arguably had a distinctive political system (Kellas, 1989; Paterson, 1994) or at least a distinctive dimension to politics (Midwinter, et al., 1991) . Administrative devolution in Wales developed later, and with less scope, when a territorial office for Wales was set up in 1964. It, too, served to underline Welsh distinctiveness in the UK (Bogdanor, 1979; Bradbury, 1998; Mitchell, 2009 (Ruane and Todd, 1999; McGarry, 2001; Tonge, 2002) . In the years which followed, political and sectarian violence emanating from Northern Ireland periodically dominated the UK political agenda. Consequently, the reintroduction of devolution to
Northern Ireland in 1998 was never part of the same decentralizing process in response to nationalist challenges, as was seen in Scotland and to some extent in Wales. Rather, it was a key component of the Good Friday Agreement 1 , and thus principally a tool of conflict resolution, influenced by broader devolutionary processes in the UK and Europe, but designed to bring an end to armed conflict and normalize politics in Northern Ireland (Mitchell and Wilford, 1999; Wilford, 2003; Ruane and Todd, 2007) . The Northern Ireland Assembly was frequently suspended in its early years as the peace process faltered.
The institutional and political development of the UK has thus been highly asymmetric, and this asymmetry has survived into the era of devolution and multi-level government. UK devolution was never orchestrated centrally according to a grand federalist plan. Rather, it was adopted in a piecemeal fashion with plans developed to suit the demands emerging from each territory. Inasmuch as there was a plan, it was to ensure the future of the Union. Welsh devolution, it was hoped, would thus modify the potential territorial impact of Scottish devolution, and help to integrate Scotland into a reformed UK state. Devolution in Northern
Ireland had entirely different motivations, to replace the politics of armed conflict with a 'politics of civility ' (Aughey, 1999) and democratic governance.
Asymmetry is also evident in the devolution settlements designed for each territory. The powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament were largely based upon the administrative responsibilities that had previously been assigned to the Scottish Office, and included primary legislative power over a wide array of domestic policies, including health, education, rural affairs, the environment and economic development. Ireland. There is, however, a growing awareness across England of a distinctive English national identity within the UK. This is gradually being articulated in a demand for an 'English dimension' to politics, but thus far has not resulted in a demand for English national or regional devolution (IPPR, 2012).
The heterogeneity and asymmetry of the UK is also evident in the multitude of electoral systems in use today. National elections are famously conducted using the simple plurality, 'first-past-the-post' system. This system has helped to prolong the dominance of two major parties, which since the early twentieth century have been the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. The two party system has been challenged in the last 30 years by the emergence of the Liberal Democrats, although its future is far from certain; since entering coalition with the Conservatives in 2010, its support has decreased significantly.
The devolved assemblies and parliaments, by contrast, were established with degrees of proportionality built into their electoral system. A form of mixed member system -modeled on the system in place for the German Bundestag -was chosen for Scotland, Wales and
London, largely as a result of political negotiation and compromise among the pro-devolution forces in the Scottish case. The Additional Member System (AMS) also had the advantage of retaining single member constituencies, a mark of conformity with the Westminster system and a reflection of the importance of constituency representation within British political culture.
These systems were not intended to achieve strict proportionality; the additional members were conceived as 'top-up' members to redress some of the disproportionality inherent in the Elections to the devolved parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are held simultaneously 3 , but this does not produce a horizontal statewide campaign. Even in 2011 when devolved elections were combined with a UK-wide referendum on electoral reform, the focus of each of the devolved elections was intra-territorial, with the referendum being largely over-shadowed. 4 The absence of a national component to the three devolved elections may in part be a result of the absence of devolution in England, but it also reflects the presence of distinctive political cultures, communities and civil societies in each of the devolved territories. We might expect that the lack of a national campaign encompassing these devolved elections would also modify the extent to which regional elections in the three devolved territories would produce second-order effects. By contrast, elections to the London Assembly, which partially conform to the cycle for municipal elections in England 5 , have both London-focused -and Mayor-focused -campaigns alongside England-wide campaigns involving the leaders of the main governing and opposition parties at Westminster. As a result, we might expect second-order dynamics to be more evident in Londoners' voting patterns.
Congruence of the Vote
When we examine voting patterns in national and regional elections across the UK, signs of incongruence emerge. However, this incongruence was not created by political devolution;
rather it foretold devolution, both reflecting and reinforcing demands for greater autonomy for the UK's sub-state nations.
These voting patterns are depicted in Figure Thus, second-order explanations thus appear incapable of accounting for these patterns in the congruence and incongruence of vote shares. The patterns we see at the aggregate level have to be understood within each regional context. This does not mean that features normally associated with second-order elections are not apparent in the UK; as we shall see momentarily, in some cases they are. Rather, the features we see are not always compatible with the assumptions of second-order elections theory, which attributes primacy to the national, first-order arena in shaping electoral behavior and outcomes in apparently subordinate electoral contests.
Second-order election effects
For regional elections to be second-order, we would expect them to differ from statewide 'first-order' elections in three respects: they would have lower turnout; if held in the middle of the term of office of the statewide government, they would produce an electoral bounce for the principal statewide opposition party; and we would expect smaller parties to record higher vote shares than they do in statewide or national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; see also Reif, 1985; Hough and Jeffery, 2006 ; and the introduction to this volume). These features of second-order elections -a consequence of these elections having 'less at stake' for the electorate -are considered below in the UK context.
Second-order elections theory suggests that turnout would be lower in elections with less at stake, that is elections with less policy scope and less territorial distinctiveness. Applied to the UK context, we would expect lower turnout in all devolved elections as compared to UK electoral turnout, but we might anticipate that levels of participation in elections to the National Assembly for Wales and the London Assembly may be lower than elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly, given that the latter have greater policy responsibility than the former, thus raising the stakes. Table 14 .1 conforms to the expected pattern of consistently lower turnout in regional elections, with the lowest levels of turnout associated with elections to institutions with lower levels of regional authority. Turnout in the devolved elections since 1999 has been markedly lower than turnout in UK-wide general elections, with average turnout lowest in the elections in London Assembly, then in Wales, and moderately higher in Scotland, and higher still in Northern Ireland. Only in Northern Ireland is turnout at the national and regional level broadly in alignment.
Notably, the change in the devolution settlement in Wales, which according to the hypothesis set out in the introduction, would potentially heighten the stakes of elections to the National Assembly for Wales, has not produced an increase in turnout, although it may be too early for any changes to resonate. The highest levels of turnout are found in the region with the greatest level of autonomy, but higher turnout in Northern Ireland is unlikely to be a reflection of a higher level of governmental competence. It may nonetheless rest on an alternative calculation of the electoral stakes. Regardless of the electoral arena in which the contest is being held, the outcome of any election can shape both the relative peace within Northern Ireland, and its future relationship with both Britain and the Irish Republic. Indeed, the significant drop in turnout in both the 2011 Assembly elections and the Westminster election a year earlier may suggest a normalization of politics in Northern Ireland as devolution beds down.
[ Table 14 .1 about here]
The presence or absence of second-order effects is also measured in the vote shares of governing and opposition parties. Measured at the aggregate level, the assumption is that governing parties will fare less well in regional elections which are held in the middle of a national government's term of office, with the principal opposition party receiving an electoral bounce. Regional elections held in close proximity to -or simultaneous withstatewide elections are more likely to conform to the national pattern (Hough and Jeffery, 2006) . A further expected outcome of second-order elections is higher levels of support for smaller parties; with less at stake, voters are assumed to be more willing to cast their votes for minor parties even though they may be unlikely to be serious contenders for government.
In the UK, elections to the devolved institutions have never been held on the same day as statewide general elections, nor are they likely to be (see endnote 4). Until 2011, the standard pattern was for elections to the devolved parliaments and assemblies to come two years after the UK-wide election, and thus fall firmly within the middle of the national electoral cycle. As discussed above, elections in Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland are held on the same day, but with very little cross-referencing. The absence of devolution in the largest territory of the UK means that simultaneous devolved elections do not produce the nationalising effects that we see for the non-historic autonomás comunidades in Spain, for example. Furthermore, the prevalence of distinctive territorial cleavages in each case ensures that the systems of party competition are seen in isolation from one another. [ Table 14 .2 about here]
The nuances and dynamics of these relationships are better captured by the descriptive picture of Table 14 [ Figure 14 .3]
In their comparative study of political behavior in European regions in the early 1990s, Hearl and Budge found that support for regionalist parties was highly correlated with the degree of distinctiveness of regional voting (Hearl and Budge, 1996) . Inasmuch as the UK fitted this pattern then, this is arguably even more the case today. Figure 14 .3 reveals that non-statewide parties play a significant role in UK politics in both statewide and regional electoral competition. Their electoral impact has been particularly evident since the early 1970s, and in the case of Scotland and Wales, the electoral breakthrough of the SNP and Plaid Cymru has arguably been the principal driver of enhanced regional autonomy. It is also evident, however, that their share of the vote is higher in elections to the devolved institutions.
Although one might be tempted to conclude that this tendency to lend greater support to nonstatewide parties in devolved elections reflects the lower stakes invested in these contests, this explanation is unconvincing. First, the variation we might expect to see between the devolved territories as a result of different degrees of political autonomy (and thus of the presumed stakes) is not apparent. Indeed, non-statewide regionalist parties in Scotland and Northern
Ireland record, on average, higher shares of the vote than in Wales, where the stakes may be deemed to be lower as a result of lower levels of institutional autonomy. Second, there are arguably more plausible explanations. Devolved elections in Scotland and Wales are dominated by the dynamics of the party system in the devolved arena and, to date, the main competition in these contests has been between the Labour Party and the main regionalist party, regardless of whether the former is in government or opposition at the UK level.
Moreover, these regionalist parties are evidently more serious contenders for government in devolved elections, increasing their likelihood of electoral success. These factors have little relationship with the assumptions of second-order theory; rather, it suggests that regional electoral competition plays to a different set of rules (Lineira, 2011).
Discussion
This chapter has assessed some of the assumptions of second-order election theory and its implications for understanding multi-level electoral competition in the UK. According to this theoretical perspective, regional elections would fall into the category of electoral competition which has less at stake, freeing voters to use the occasions to experiment with smaller parties, or to use the occasion to pass judgment on state-level concerns. More nuanced applications of this perspective at the regional level have underlined that judgments about what is at stake may vary considerably between different regional electoral arenas, dependent upon the relative strength of the institutions to which voters are electing their representatives (Henderson and McEwen, 2010; Lineira, 2011 ; see also the introduction of this volume).
Some regional governments have considerable decision-making autonomy, implying that election outcomes in these cases may have rather a lot at stake. Judgments of the 'stakes' at play may also go beyond institutional authority, with implications for constitutional futures.
Subjective assessments of the importance of elections and institutions may also matter -for example, those who feel a strong sense of attachment to their region may invest a stake in the contest to decide who will represent the region, regardless of the level of institutional autonomy that region enjoys.
The relatively recent experience of multi-level government in the United Kingdom, and its profound asymmetry, may limit the extent to which it is comparable with other countries 1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 1999 , 2003 , 2007 , 2011 Northern Ireland: 1998 , 2003 , 2007 , 2011 London: 2000; 2004; 2008; 2012. Source: Electoral Commission; London Elects; Rallings and Thrasher, 2009. guaranteeing that re-unification would only take place with the explicit democratic consent of a majority in Northern Ireland. 2 Elected mayors have been introduced sporadically in other parts of England too, but they have not been accompanied by an elected regional assembly and the mayor's office lacks the gravitas or symbolic significance of the London mayor (see Curtice, et al., 2008) . 3 The exception is the first election to the Northern Ireland Assembly, which was held in 1998, a year earlier than the Scottish and Welsh elections. 4 The introduction of fixed-term parliaments for the House of Commons would have resulted in simultaneous Westminster and devolved elections in 2015, as the devolved institutions ordinarily have four year fixed terms. However, simultaneity has been purposefully avoided by exceptionally extending the devolved term to five years. 5 Although there is simultaneity of a sort in English municipal elections, the cycle is rather complex, with metropolitan, and some single tier and two-tier districts electing a third of councilors every four years, on four year terms; and county councils, parish councils, London boroughs and other single tier and two-tier district councils having whole council elections every four years. To add to the complexity, each type of authority has its own electoral cycle.
In 2012, when the most recent London Assembly and Mayoral election was held, local elections were held across 128 local authorities in England, with separate local elections also taking place in Scotland and Wales. 6 London is not included in this table because elections to the London Assembly do not produce a government. Rather Executive authority in the Greater London Authority lies with the Mayor's office.
